It was Ukraine

Two draft compromise proposals to end the war in Ukraine are on the negotiating table.

In both, there is something unsaid that no one dares to write: by giving up control of territories, whether “de facto” or “de jure”, Ukraine has already lost this war. Anyone who says the opposite, no matter what mental gymnastics they use, is only fooling themselves. And wishful thinking is not a sensible strategy.

What is left now is to negotiate the exact limits of Russia’s victory. Moscow would like to turn Ukraine into a new Belarus. It will not succeed: the core of Ukrainian sovereignty based in Kiev will remain independent. In a tactical retreat, Russia will try to impose neutrality. The Europeans, who still want to make the remaining Ukraine their first line of defence, will do everything they can to stop that neutrality.

They will do this in two main ways. The first is through law: they will try to avoid the Ukrainian Constitution being locked, like Austria’s in 1955, by permanently banning NATO membership. Trump is temporary. From a Western point of view, it is better not to close the door, in legal terms, to a possible future change of course by the United States. This will be one of the main points of friction with Moscow.

The second point of friction will be the presence of European troops on Ukrainian territory after the war. It is likely that this will be a Russian red line. And it is also likely that Trump will be quite sensitive to that objection. Russia has already accepted that it will not absorb the whole of Ukraine, but it will not give up trying to ensure that the part it does not control cannot later become militarily stronger against it.

Trump’s 28‑point proposal is, basically, a list of concessions to Russian interests. The reason is simple: Washington believes that Russia is winning the war and has decided it will not invest enough to help Kiev regain the 1991 borders. The American calculation is that arming Ukraine to the point where it could pose an existential threat to Russia would, sooner or later, force the United States to intervene directly, with the risk of an unpredictable escalation. Arguing about whether this fear is exaggerated or not does not matter. This seems to be what is guiding the White House.

On top of that, Trump’s America wants to get significant economic benefits from this outcome. The 28‑point document clearly shows an American deal‑making ambition, which may include advantages in Donbass, in the Arctic, or in other areas. Putin, for his part, desperately needs a political victory that justifies the economic and human cost since 2022. Trump can offer him a return to the G8, the closing of the ICC case, the easing or lifting of sanctions, maybe even a return to SWIFT. Trump is Putin’s lifeline. Without him, Russia may be winning the war, but it will not be in a position to secure peace.

In the past, at the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some internal notes were sent “for higher consideration” with this line: “Your Excellency, however, in your superior judgment, will decide better.” Trump hopes that European and Ukrainian submission will lead them to accept, resignedly, that he, in his “superior judgment”, will better decide the fate of a country that, in his view, has already lost the war. This is Ukraine’s tragedy, and Zelensky has already understood it.